Episodes of monetary instability in Ottoman Egypt stimulated a discussion of monetary doctrine among Egyptian rabbis. A central issue was the valuation of debts following changes in the value of silver coins. While the leading rabbi of the sixteenth century advocated linkage to gold coins, the rabbis of the seventeenth century adopted valuation by purchasing power and rejected valuation by weight and linkage to gold coins. The rabbis of the seventeenth century differed from their predecessors in two essential respects: they were more critical of traditional Jewish monetary doctrine and they utilized a much more sophisticated form of economic analysis.
Introduction
A small but growing literature examines the history of economic ideas in rabbinic jurisprudence. Until recently, this literature focused primarily on the Babylonian Talmud, which was redacted in the sixth century CE; post-Talmudic developments received little attention (Kleiman, 1997) . 1 The seminal works in the history of Talmudic economics were authored by Kleiman (1987a Kleiman ( , 1987b ) and Ohrenstein and Gordon (1992) on general Talmudic economics and Kleiman (1973) and Liebermann (1979) on Talmudic monetary doctrine. Although the rabbis did not address monetary doctrine as an independent subject, their opinions on debt valuation contain important statements on monetary doctrine, often embedded within layers of complex legal argumentation. The rabbinic literature on debt valuation also contains historical data on exchange rate developments, as well as observations concerning price adjustment, the valuation of coins by merchants, official exchange rate policy with regard to tax collections and disbursements, and general socioeconomic conditions. Although the primary task of the rabbis was to adjudicate the cases before them, some rabbis employed economic analysis in an effort to more fully comprehend the economic processes that were at work in Ottoman Egypt.
This paper undertakes a comprehensive analysis of the legal opinions of three leading rabbis, with an emphasis on doctrinal, historical, and institutional aspects of their rulings. These opinions were selected based on the significance of their contributions to the development of Jewish monetary doctrine.
The presentation of the rabbinical material is accompanied by an account of historical context, drawing on modern research in Ottoman economic history and Jewish history. The analysis demonstrates that the rabbis were confronted with complex questions, which could not be resolved simply by citing the canonical texts of Jewish law.
The limitations of the canonical texts -the Babylonian Talmud and the works of its medieval interpreters -forced the rabbis to offer innovative reinterpretations of established concepts and rulings. A major turning point came in the seventeenth century, when the rabbis ruled that coins must be valued according to purchasing power. By adopting this rule, they rejected the alternatives of valuation by weight and linkage to gold coins. This decision requiring valuation by purchasing power contradicted the views of previous Egyptian rabbis as well as the Islamic conventions that prevailed in Ottoman society. This ruling appears to have been strongly influenced by the methodological approach of the seventeenth-century rabbis, who differed from their predecessors in two important respects: they took a more critical approach towards traditional Jewish monetary doctrines and they employed a much more sophisticated form of economic analysis.
The paper is organized as follows: Sections 2-6 provide essential information on the monetary history of Ottoman Egypt, Jewish law in the post-Talmudic era, Ottoman
Jewish legal writings on money, money in the writings of sixteenth-century Egyptian rabbis, and Talmudic monetary law. Section 7, which is the core of the paper, is an indepth reading of three rabbinical opinions. The latter two opinions are preceded by historical introductions, which provide details that are excluded from the general overview in Section 2. For all three opinions, the legal arguments are elucidated, interspersed with further historical discussion as required. The explanations conclude with a brief summary of legal conclusions and doctrinal significance.
The monetary history of Ottoman Egypt
Under the Ottomans, Egypt was a peripheral province, in the sense that it was geographically distant from the Ottoman core (Anatolia and the Balkans, with the capital at Istanbul) and was administered rather loosely. Over time, the Mamluk military class gained power in Egypt at the expense of the official Ottoman administration (see Table   1 ).
The monetary history of Egypt is best understood within the context of the monetary history of the Ottoman core. Therefore, this section begins with the monetary history of the core (Istanbul) and then integrates the monetary history of Egypt (Cairo).
The historical account is drawn primarily from Sevket Pamuk's monetary history of the Ottoman Empire (2000a).
The Ottomans had a mixed record with respect to monetary stability. The major causes of instability were shortages of specie, specie movements associated with international trade, and -after the sixteenth century -the growing economic power of Europe and contemporaneous decline of the Empire. Periodic fiscal crises precipitated major debasements. Ottoman Empire featured a simple silver-based monetary system, which was fully transformed into a gold-silver-copper system by 1625 (for the purposes of this paper, the copper coinage may be ignored). The gold coinage was based on the Venetian ducat, with a uniform standard throughout the Empire. The silver coinage varied by region in accordance with local (pre-Ottoman) conventions; seven major silver zones existed (one of which was Egypt). Istanbul's monetary system (omitting copper) was as follows: The gold sultani (introduced in 1477) was an Ottoman version of the Venetian ducat, with no face value. 3 The silver akce (or asper; introduced ca. 1300) was the unit of account, and was valued by specie content. Generally, the Ottomans allowed the markets to determine the akce/sultani exchange rates; because the gold/silver ratio fluctuated freely, Gresham's law was inoperative. 4 Ottoman officials understood the inherent difficulty of enforcing economic regulations. They therefore adopted a pragmatic attitude toward monetary regulation, intervening only occasionally to influence specie and coin supplies, prices, and exchange rates. They allowed foreign coins to circulate, and even accepted them at the treasury in the interest of maximizing the supply of coinage and bullion. European coins began to circulate after 1550.
In Egypt, the traditional silver unit was the medin, which had been introduced by In the sixteenth century, Cairo was a leading center for gold coinage; the local mint produced both sultani and sherifi, the Egyptian version of the sultani. The sherifi replaced the Mamluk ashrafi, which was also based on the Venetian ducat. The sherifi exchanged at par with the sultani and was minted throughout the Empire.
Gold outflows from Cairo to Istanbul played an important role in Ottoman monetary affairs. From the inception of Ottoman rule, Egypt was expected to maintain a budget surplus to be sent to the Sultan in Istanbul as Irsalliyye-i-Hazine, or tribute (Shaw, 1962) . 5 During the sixteenth century, the tribute was 400,000 to 600,000 gold pieces per year. During the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth century, another 50,000-100,000 gold pieces were sent from Cairo each year to support the Holy Cities in the Hijaz and the pilgrimage to Mecca. 6 In 1585, the Empire experienced a severe fiscal crisis, which caused the authorities to debase the akce by 44% in one step. The decades that followed saw sharp fluctuations in the silver content of the akce and the akce/sultani exchange rate (see Table   5 ). The akce never recovered its pre-1585 value, and virtually disappeared in the 1640s.
During the sixteenth century, the Egyptian medin fluctuated in weight and fineness. However, the medin was not debased in 1585, 7 and the decline in its silver content was quite moderate compared to the decline in the silver content of the akce (see Tables 4 and 5 ). After fluctuating for many years, the akce/medin exchange rate settled at 3.0 in 1640. Until the late sixteenth century, the leading foreign coin in Egypt was the gold Venetian ducat; later, the leading foreign coins were the Dutch lion thaler and Spanish eight real, both of which were large silver coins.
In Istanbul, large silver coins were introduced beginning in 1690. The largest was the kurush or piaster (= 40 medin = 120 akce), which was close to the standards of the Dutch lion thaler. The kurush was stable until 1789. Although the (debased) akce continued to circulate, by the 1720s the medin had replaced it as the unit of account for small transactions in Istanbul.
Despite the introduction of the kurush, the medin remained the leading silver coin in Egypt. The kurush was not minted in Cairo until 1769, despite imperial orders to mint large silver coins. In the first half of the eighteenth century, the standards of Cairo's medin fell below the standards of Istanbul's medin; the discrepancy was as high as 30%.
In the late seventeenth century, the sultani/sherifi was discontinued. Over the years 1697-1728, a series of gold coins was introduced simultaneously in Istanbul and Cairo: the tugrali (or Istanbul), cedid Istanbul, zincirly, findik, and zer-i mahbub. These coins had no face value; with the exception of the zer-i mahbub, the Istanbul versions were initially minted with a gold content close to that of the ducat. The Cairo versions contained less gold and exchanged at a 15%-20% discount against their Istanbul counterparts. The responsa of Ottoman rabbis contain a wealth of historical information on social and economic conditions, and are therefore of great value to historians (Lewis, 1984, p. 114 ). However, the use of the responsa as historical sources is problematic because basic historical details are often missing (e.g., dates, authentic names). Economic data are often limited in scope, and some of the terminology is unfamiliar. Therefore, the identification of historical details (e.g., people, places, goods, prices, and exchange rates)
in the Ottoman responsa is a challenging and important task (Shmuelevitz, 1984) . 
Egyptian rabbinical opinions on money in the sixteenth century
The Jews of Cairo 14 maintained an active rabbinical court in the late fifteenth century (and possibly earlier), but no legal material has survived. The earliest known
Egyptian legal material dates from the sixteenth century, when rabbis were asked about repayment of marriage contracts in debased coins. 15 In their response, the rabbis upheld the communal custom of paying marriage contracts nominalistically (in debased coins, without adjustment). They ignored the compromise solution enacted by the rabbis of Safed (early 1580s), under which losses were divided equally between the parties (Schochetman, 1978 (Schochetman, , 1985 . 16 The writings of the sixteenth-century rabbis on monetary matters are less economically sophisticated than the writings of their seventeenth-century successors. Nevertheless, they represent a stage in the development of Jewish monetary doctrine and should be studied separately.
A synopsis of Talmudic monetary law
In order to fully comprehend rabbinic writings on money, some background in (e.g., gold and silver) are exchanged, one coin is assigned the status of "coin" (i.e., money par excellence) while the other coin is assigned the status of "produce" (i.e., commodity). The individual who receives the "produce" coin is considered to be the buyer; his physical acceptance is what finalizes the transaction. What determines the status of a coin? A coin that is widely accepted is assigned the status of "coin," while a coin that is relatively less accepted is assigned the status of "produce." The "produce" category can also include coins that are unstable or continually debased.
The distinction between "coin" and "produce" has another important implication.
If prices or exchange rates fluctuate, the Talmud attributes the fluctuations entirely to developments in commodity markets or changes in the value of "produce" -i.e., lesser coins. The value of "coin" is fixed in Jewish legal theory; when valuing debts denominated in "coin," a nominalistic approach is taken. Lender 4:11 19 ): If produce prices rise or fall due to the change in coin weight, the debt should be adjusted fully. If produce prices did not change, and the new coin differs from the old coin in weight by more than 25%, the debt should be adjusted fully. If produce prices did not change, and the new coin differs from the old coin in weight by 25% or less, the debtor must pay in new coin exactly the number of coins he borrowed, with no adjustment being made (see Table 3 for a tabular representation). This rule, which we shall call the "25% rule," is perplexing because it combines an element of valuation by weight with an element of valuation by purchasing power; the commentaries on the Talmud struggled to explain it (Schiffman, 2005) .
Case (b): Price fluctuations and repayment of a loan made in kind.
The Talmudic rabbis defined two distinct types of interest: "stipulated interest," which is directly charged when the loan is made, and "dust of interest," which is generated in an indirect, ex post manner. The rabbis considered the first type to be biblically prohibited, the second type to be rabbinically prohibited.
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The Talmud prohibits (interest-free) commodity loans because they are likely to lead to ex post interest when evaluated in monetary terms. Consider a loan of wheat for wheat. Should the price of wheat increase, the borrower will end up repaying wheat of greater monetary value than the wheat he borrowed. Therefore, the Talmud dictates that such loans should not be made in the first place. 
Rabbinic opinions on money

The selection of rabbinical material
The rabbinical opinions that form the basis for this study were selected from eleven published works, authored by nine leading Egyptian rabbis of the sixteenth to Halevi (both of the seventeenth century).
Rabbi Jacob Castro: Linkage to gold coins
Rabbi Jacob Castro, known as Maharikash (1525?-1612), was the son of Abraham de Castro, who served as master of the Cairo mint in the 1520s .
Rabbi Jacob Castro was the spiritual leader of Cairo's Arabic-speaking Jewish community 22 and also an active merchant. One of his leading works is Erech lechem (Setting of bread), a gloss on the law code Shulchan aruch (Set Rabbi Castro advocates linkage to the gold coin in the case of debasement/ reinforcement of the silver coin. Under the special assumption of a constant gold-silver ratio, 28 linkage to the gold coin is equivalent to valuation of the silver coin by weight.
This rule is identical to the rule followed by Islamic jurists in Bursa (Gerber, 1982) ; unfortunately, we lack information concerning the practice of Egyptian Islamic jurists.
Rabbi Castro ignores changes in extrinsic value -that is, changes in the gold-silver ratio or changes in purchasing power that are not caused by a change in specie content.
Nevertheless, he is willing to adjust for changes in extrinsic value if they are imposed by the authorities.
Rabbi Mordecai Halevi: Valuation by purchasing power
In 1631-2, the tribute was set at 30,000,000 medin. However, Egypt failed to meet this target; gradually, remittances fell to 20,000,000 medin in good years and zero in bad years. Over the years 1660-75, a series of governors were sent from Istanbul to reform Egypt's administration and budget with the goal of restoring the remittance to its target value. However, the Mamluk emirs succeeded in reversing the reforms (Shaw, 1962, pp. 283-312 Table 6 ). These data match Rabbi Mordecai's data reasonably well. By interpolation, we can date the original loan to 1660-7. The repayment date specified in the contract must have preceded the year 1676; the responsum must have been written at some point during the years 1673-83.
Rabbi Mordecai begins his reply by citing the code of Rabbi Jacob ben Asher Rabbi Mordecai rejects this notion outright: "This is something that the mind cannot tolerate." In this case, Rabbi Mordecai points out, the designation of the thaler as "coin" implies that the debtor, who had borrowed in thaler at 30 medin, must repay in thaler at 43 medin. Since the unit of account is the medin, and produce prices and wages (of simple laborers and craftsmen) in medin are unchanged, the lender will receive interest of over one third, when measured in terms of purchasing power. Rabbi Mordecai adamantly rejects this outcome. Rabbi Mordecai supports his view by citing Jewish law on the subject of commodity loans: if a commodity loan was made (despite the prohibition), and the price of the commodity rose, the debt must be adjusted downward.
Rabbi Mordecai argues that there is no substantive difference between exchange rate appreciation and a commodity price increase; both lead to transfers of purchasing power.
Rabbi Mordecai also asserts that the 25% rule is designed to prevent transfers of purchasing power. Thus, Rabbi Mordecai struggles with a direct contradiction between the implications of the "coin" vs. "produce" paradigm and the 25% rule.
To resolve the contradiction, Rabbi Mordecai suggests a fundamental distinction between changes in intrinsic value (reinforcement) and changes in extrinsic value (exchange rate appreciation). In cases of reinforcement, the 25% rule mandates downward adjustment. The coinage has been altered physically; unadjusted repayment involves a transfer of purchasing power and is unacceptable. In the case of a change in extrinsic value, the "coin"/"produce" paradigm applies. One can, theoretically, regard silver coins as "coin" and gold coins as "produce." Since there has been no physical change in the silver "coin," unadjusted repayment is acceptable, even if it involves a transfer of purchasing power. Rabbi Mordecai rejects this proposed resolution, again exclaiming "this is something that the mind cannot tolerate." Under the proposed resolution, transfers of purchasing power associated with "produce" are prohibited, whether the cause of the transfer is intrinsic or extrinsic; transfers of purchasing power associated with "coin" are prohibited only if the cause of the transfer is intrinsic. For
Rabbi Mordecai, such a distinction is economically untenable -all transfers of purchasing power should have the same legal status, regardless of their underlying cause.
Furthermore, Rabbi Mordecai argues that the "coin" vs. "produce" paradigm is inapplicable where inflation is obviously caused by a change in extrinsic value. 32 In this case, the medin and akce are debased due to counterfeiting or various other reasons.
Merchants, he says, avoid medin and akce, preferring Dutch thaler, Spanish reals, and gold sherifi, and have raised medin prices in order to discourage medin payments.
Merchants have avoided even good, heavy, or new medin. One can also see, Rabbi
Mordecai continues, that the appreciation of the thaler is a market phenomenon, which has never been sanctioned officially by the governor or "officer of the city of Cairo"
(probably the muhtesib, or chief market inspector, who supervised weights, measures, and prices in the food markets; Shaw, 1962, p. 118 ). This phenomenon did not occur in the times of the Talmud; the case in question, according to Rabbi Mordecai, is new and unprecedented.
Rabbi Mordecai argues that the "coin"/"produce" paradigm applies only where the coin designated as "produce" is susceptible to debasement. This is not the case here:
the thaler, real, and gold sherifi in this case are stable and not susceptible to debasement.
Rabbi Mordecai's discomfort with the "coin" vs. "produce" paradigm is obvious. Due to the Talmud's canonicity, he is unable to abrogate it, so he uses interpretive license to limit its applicability. However, a loan made in medin should be repaid without adjustment, since the medin's purchasing power is unchanged.
At this point, Rabbi Mordecai adds a cryptic qualification: "However, from the standpoint of other goods whose prices are linked to the thaler…[the rabbinic judge]
should be precise in taking account of the debasement." I suggest the following interpretation: Suppose that there are two types of goods in the economy -domestic goods, whose prices are independent of the exchange rate, and foreign goods, whose prices move one for one with the exchange rate. Rabbi Mordecai is saying that repayment should be based on a weighted average of exchange rates: 39α + 43(1-α). The choice of α is left to judicial discretion; Rabbi Mordecai does not elaborate. 38 Rabbi Mordecai concludes his ruling: If the loan contract specified medin, it must be repaid without any adjustment, given that produce prices and wages of workers and craftsmen have not changed. If the borrower swore to pay in thaler, "whether they [the thaler] rise or fall," the judge should order a compromise, because the violation of an oath is a severe prohibition. Rabbi Mordecai does not specify the form of the compromise.
In summary, Rabbi Mordecai asserts that the criterion for the valuation of debts must be purchasing power, not weight. He favors repayment according to the official exchange rate if the authorities debased the currency without updating the official exchange rate while the price level remained stable. Rabbi Mordecai argues that transfers of purchasing power must be avoided, whether their underlying cause is intrinsic or extrinsic, and radically reinterprets the words of authorities who disagree rather than openly disputing them. 39 Rabbi Mordecai was the first Egyptian rabbi to mention the possibility of compromise. However, he accepted the compromise solution only in the specific case in which the borrower swore to link to thaler; he did not see compromise as a standard solution to the debt valuation problem.
Rabbi Abraham Halevi's ruling: A textual analysis
In 1694-7, Egypt experienced a major famine and plague, caused by "the failure of the Nile to water the lands properly" (Shaw, 1962 , p. 295; see also Faroqhi, 1994, p. 440). Food prices rose dramatically, 40 the fiscal situation deteriorated, and a general state of anarchy prevailed. In the year 1694-5, the tribute was 21,700,000 medin, well short of its 30,000,000 medin target. Soldiers and pensioners rioted, demanding unpaid wages.
The severity of the crisis is illustrated well by the tragedy of Yasif al Yahudi Therefore, rabbinic judges must consider the purchasing power of medin and not other coins, even though the medin does not function as the medium of exchange.
Rabbi Abraham then raises a question that is not found in other rabbinic sources:
when adjusting debts for changes in purchasing power, which prices should be considered in calculating the adjustment? He answers that only domestic produce prices should be considered, not import prices. After all, foreign exporters are not concerned with the value of their currencies in Egypt. For example, he says, imported silk and coffee have become much more expensive in Egypt due to the thaler's appreciation, but thaler prices in the exporting countries remain fixed. In modern terminology, Rabbi
Abraham reports that exchange rate pass-through is complete; in other words, exporters
to Egypt do not engage in pricing to market. 54 He continues by ruling that if some domestic prices change but others do not the judge should divide the loss between lender and borrower. Rabbi Abraham does not specify exactly how the loss should be divided;
presumably, the settlement would be based on some average of food prices. and (c) loan contracts denominated in medin. He observes that the thaler has been devalued more than the sherifi. For some goods, the devaluations of the sherifi and thaler affected prices, but for others there was no effect. For example, one who purchased food and produce for 100 medin used to pay 1 sherifi (at 95 medin) plus 5 medin. Now, Rabbi
Abraham states, that person must pay 1 sherifi (at 90 medin) plus 10 medin. Still, in his opinion, nothing has changed in terms of "good" medin; these have always been valued at 90 per sherifi. The difference in purchasing power between new and old medin, he says, is readily apparent when one enters a shop. If the customer brings good medin, the shopkeeper gives him the greatest choice, the best merchandise, and a large measure (i.e., is generous with the measure). But if the customer brings bad medin, the shopkeeper displays the worst merchandise, uses a small measure, and tries to avoid making a sale altogether. Therefore, Rabbi Abraham rules that for all three types of contracts, the parties should compute the value of the medin in sherifi and divide the loss equally. Here he reverts to the compromise solution, which he strongly favors. 56 The sherifi, Rabbi
Abraham says, is considered the primary coin; one can easily collect 100 sherifi, assay them with a moneychanger, and hide them in one's bosom, where they will go unnoticed (especially by dishonest people). The thaler, on the other hand, requires much effort to count and weigh with the moneychanger, and is therefore highly noticeable. Rabbi Abraham claims that the case under discussion is completely different.
Here, the new coin has greater purchasing power due to a governmental exchange rate decree. This is more significant than Rabbi Eliezer's case for two reasons: (a) in reality, large merchants do not accept new coins at a premium simply because they are newonly small storekeepers and "those who sell meager amounts" are willing to do so, and (b) the new coin premium is temporary -it disappears as coins age -but the effect of an exchange rate decree is permanent, or "it is a pole that shall not wobble." Like his father In the end, Rabbi Abraham rejects both valuation by weight and linkage to gold coins, not so much because these alternatives lack textual support, but because they imply an unwarranted transfer of purchasing power to the borrower. Rabbi Abraham's ruling is based on the following principles: preference for compromise (unlike his predecessors);
valuation by purchasing power; and limitation of the 25% rule to cases of imperfect valuation by weight that do not involve the unit of account.
Conclusion
This In addition, the ultra-Orthodox economy is highly dollarized. Ultra-Orthodox nonprofit organizations receive much of their financial support from the US, and therefore link their disbursements to the dollar. The unexpected appreciation of the NIS caused severe hardship, both for businesses that set their prices in dollars and for recipients of payments from ultra-Orthodox nonprofits . In order to alleviate this hardship, ultra-Orthodox rabbis fixed the exchange rate at 4 NIS for intracommunal transactions. This policy, which was never explained in detail, appears to have been inspired by the compromise solution of the Ottoman rabbis. Gold-silver-copper system, with distinct silver zones; the Empire was strong politically, economically, and fiscally.
1585-1690
Chronic monetary instability, caused by political, economic, and fiscal crises combined with intercontinental specie movements; increased circulation of foreign silver coins, in both good and debased versions.
1690-1844
New silver unit, stable until the 1780s; monetary linkages between the center and the periphery were strengthened. Source: Pamuk (2000a, p. 20) Note: The silver content listed here is the legal standard. Coins in circulation often contained less silver; from 1690, the discrepancy in silver content was 20-30%. Tables 4 and 5 . Due to gaps in the data, it is assumed that over 1659-1683, the akce/medin exchange rate remained constant at its 1670 value of 2.8.
